モジュール25：長文の構造的把握 演習編

長文の構造的把握は、1,000語を超える複雑な英文を限られた時間内で正確に読み解くための決定的な能力である。早稲田大学法学部、慶應義塾大学経済学部、東京大学といった最難関大学では、単なる語彙力や文法知識を超えた、文章全体の論理構造を把握する能力が試される。本演習では、統語・意味・語用・談話の四層を統合的に分析する技術を実践的に適用し、問題解決型、説明型、比較対照型、原因分析型という異なる談話構造を持つ文章に取り組む。各大問は約1,000-1,500語の学術的論説文で構成され、論証構造の把握、筆者の主張と根拠の関係、暗黙の前提と含意の導出といった高度な読解能力を測定する。

入試での出題分析

出題形式と難易度

項目	評価
難易度	★★★★★ 発展
分量	極めて多い（総語数約4,500語）
語彙レベル	学術語彙・抽象語彙が中心
構文複雑度	複文・重文の多層的連鎖が頻出
抽象度	高度な抽象的議論が中心
論理構造	多層的な論証・複雑な因果関係
背景知識	経済学・社会科学の基礎知識が有利

頻出パターン

早慶

• 1,000-1,500語の学術的論説文が2-3題出題され、論証構造の把握を問う設問が中心となる
• 内容一致問題では選択肢が巧妙に設計され、部分的には正しいが全体としては誤りという攪乱要因が頻出する
• 推論問題では、明示されていない前提や含意を導出する能力が試される

東大・京大・旧帝大

• 600-800語の文章が3-5題で構成され、総語数は2,500-3,500語に達する
• 要約問題や説明問題が出題され、構造的理解に基づく情報の圧縮能力が問われる
• 段落整序問題や空所補充問題で、談話構造の理解が直接的に試される

差がつくポイント

1. 冒頭での構造認識の速度と正確性：文章の冒頭1-2段落で談話構造の型を正確に認識できるかが、その後の読解効率を決定的に左右する。型の認識が遅れると、各部分の機能を誤解し、重要な情報を見落とす結果となる。
2. 多層的分析の統合能力：統語・意味・語用・談話の各層を個別に理解するだけでなく、それらを統合的に把握する能力が求められる。複数の層の情報を総合して初めて正確な理解に到達できる。
3. 論証構造の批判的分析：筆者の主張を鵜呑みにせず、主張と根拠の関係、暗黙の前提、論理的飛躍を識別し、論証の強度を評価する能力が、推論問題や筆者の意図を問う問題での正答率を左右する。

演習問題

試験時間: 80分 / 満点: 100点

第１問（25点）

以下の英文を読み、後の設問に答えなさい。

The resurgence of protectionist sentiment in advanced economies represents a fundamental challenge to the post-World War II international economic order. For seven decades, successive rounds of trade liberalization under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), progressively reduced barriers to international commerce. This process was predicated on the assumption that free trade benefits all participating nations by allowing each to specialize according to comparative advantage, thereby maximizing global welfare. However, this consensus has eroded dramatically in recent years, as populist movements in both Europe and North America have successfully mobilized electoral support by promising to protect domestic industries and workers from foreign competition.

The intellectual foundations of this backlash can be traced to a growing recognition that the distributional consequences of trade liberalization have been far more uneven than anticipated by standard economic models. While trade generates aggregate gains—consumers benefit from lower prices and greater variety, while firms access larger markets and exploit economies of scale—these gains are not distributed uniformly within countries. Import competition disproportionately affects workers in manufacturing sectors, particularly those with industry-specific skills that cannot easily be transferred to other occupations. The adjustment costs borne by displaced workers can be severe and prolonged, especially in regions where manufacturing constituted the primary source of employment. Moreover, labor market institutions in many advanced economies have weakened over the past four decades, reducing the bargaining power of workers and limiting the effectiveness of traditional mechanisms for sharing the benefits of trade more broadly.

Economists have long acknowledged that trade creates both winners and losers, but the standard policy prescription—that winners could compensate losers through redistributive taxation and social insurance programs—has proven politically difficult to implement in practice. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which holds that a policy change is desirable if winners could hypothetically compensate losers while still being better off, abstracts from the political economy constraints that make such compensation unlikely. In reality, those who benefit from trade liberalization typically have greater political influence than those who bear its costs, creating a systematic bias against adequate compensation. Furthermore, once trade agreements are signed and production relocates abroad, the political momentum for compensation dissipates, leaving affected communities to manage the consequences of deindustrialization with inadequate support.

Recent empirical research has quantified these distributional impacts with unprecedented precision, providing scientific validation for what many workers in import-competing regions have experienced firsthand. Studies using detailed geographic and industry-level data have demonstrated that exposure to Chinese import competition between 2000 and 2007 led to substantial employment losses in affected U.S. manufacturing sectors, with limited offsetting employment gains in other industries or regions. The “China shock,” as economists have termed it, resulted in the permanent displacement of hundreds of thousands of workers, contributing to declining labor force participation rates, stagnant wages, and deteriorating social outcomes in the most severely affected communities. Critically, these effects persisted for over a decade, contradicting the assumption of rapid labor market adjustment that underlies much trade theory.

The political ramifications of these economic dislocations have been profound. In the United States, counties most exposed to import competition from China exhibited significantly higher support for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, suggesting that trade-related economic anxiety contributed to the populist surge that brought protectionist policies back to the forefront of American politics. Similar patterns have been observed in Europe, where regions facing intense import competition have shown increased support for anti-globalization parties across the political spectrum. This political feedback loop creates a self-reinforcing dynamic: economic dislocation fuels populist mobilization, which in turn produces policy changes that further fragment the international trading system.

Yet protectionism offers no credible solution to the challenges facing workers in advanced economies. Raising tariffs or imposing quotas may temporarily preserve some manufacturing jobs, but at considerable cost to consumers and to the efficiency of the broader economy. Protection shields uncompetitive industries from the discipline of international competition, reducing incentives for innovation and productivity improvement. Moreover, protectionist measures invite retaliation from trading partners, potentially triggering a cycle of escalating trade barriers that would undermine the multilateral trading system and reduce global welfare. Historical experience provides sobering lessons: the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which raised U.S. tariffs to record levels, provoked retaliatory measures from other countries and is widely believed to have deepened the Great Depression by collapsing international trade.

A more promising approach would address the distributional consequences of trade directly through robust adjustment assistance programs, expanded social insurance, and investments in education and retraining. Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs in the United States have historically been underfunded and narrowly targeted, providing benefits to only a small fraction of displaced workers. Expanding these programs to provide comprehensive income support, health insurance, and retraining opportunities would help workers transition to new employment while maintaining political support for open trade. Denmark’s “flexicurity” model, which combines labor market flexibility with generous unemployment benefits and active labor market policies, demonstrates that it is possible to maintain openness to international trade while providing workers with substantial economic security.

Beyond adjustment assistance, addressing the inequality that trade liberalization has exacerbated requires broader reforms to ensure that the gains from trade are shared more equitably. Progressive taxation, strengthened labor market institutions, and investments in public goods such as infrastructure and education can help distribute economic gains more broadly while enhancing the economy’s capacity to adapt to structural change. The challenge for policymakers is to craft a political coalition in favor of these reforms, overcoming the resistance of those who benefit from the current distribution of gains from trade. This requires not only sound economic analysis but also effective political leadership capable of articulating a compelling vision of shared prosperity.

The future of the international trading system depends on whether advanced economies can successfully navigate this political and economic challenge. If the grievances of workers and communities adversely affected by trade liberalization continue to be neglected, protectionist sentiment will likely intensify, potentially leading to the dismantling of the rules-based trading order that has supported global prosperity for seven decades. Conversely, if policymakers can implement credible measures to address distributional concerns while preserving the benefits of openness, it may be possible to restore public support for international economic integration. The stakes could hardly be higher: the choice is between a fractured world economy characterized by beggar-thy-neighbor policies and declining living standards, or a more inclusive form of globalization that delivers widely shared gains while managing the inevitable disruptions that international competition entails.

設問

(1) According to the passage, why has the consensus in favor of free trade eroded in recent years? Answer in approximately 80 Japanese characters. (6点)

(2) What does the author mean by stating that “the Kaldor-Hicks criterion…abstracts from the political economy constraints that make such compensation unlikely” (paragraph 3)? Explain in approximately 100 Japanese characters. (7点)

(3) How did the “China shock” challenge assumptions underlying much trade theory? Answer in approximately 100 Japanese characters. (6点)

(4) Which of the following best describes the author’s argument in this passage? (6点)

a) Free trade should be abandoned because it creates more losers than winners.

b) Protectionism is justified when it protects workers from foreign competition.

c) The benefits of trade can be preserved if distributional concerns are adequately addressed.

d) Historical evidence shows that trade liberalization inevitably leads to political instability.

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第２問（25点）

以下の英文を読み、後の設問に答えなさい。

Monetary policy transmission—the process by which central bank actions affect the broader economy—operates through multiple, interconnected channels. Understanding these transmission mechanisms is essential for evaluating the effectiveness of monetary policy and for anticipating how changes in policy stance will influence economic outcomes. While the traditional focus has been on the interest rate channel, through which policy rate adjustments alter borrowing costs and thereby affect spending decisions, modern central banking recognizes that monetary policy influences the economy through a complex web of financial and behavioral channels.

The interest rate channel remains the most direct and widely understood transmission mechanism. When a central bank lowers its policy rate—the interest rate at which it lends to commercial banks—this reduction typically propagates through the financial system, causing commercial banks to lower their lending rates to firms and households. Lower borrowing costs stimulate investment by firms, as projects that were previously unprofitable at higher interest rates become viable. Similarly, lower rates encourage households to borrow for consumption, particularly for durable goods such as automobiles and housing. The aggregate effect of increased investment and consumption is higher aggregate demand, which raises output and employment in the short run. However, the strength of this channel depends critically on several factors: the elasticity of investment and consumption with respect to interest rates, the health of bank balance sheets, and the extent to which policy rate changes are passed through to market interest rates.

The exchange rate channel operates through international markets. A reduction in domestic interest rates makes domestic assets less attractive to foreign investors relative to foreign assets, leading to capital outflows as investors seek higher returns abroad. This capital movement causes the domestic currency to depreciate. A weaker currency makes exports more competitive in international markets while raising the domestic-currency price of imports. The resulting improvement in net exports—exports minus imports—boosts aggregate demand. The effectiveness of this channel depends on the exchange rate regime: countries with fixed exchange rates cannot exploit this mechanism, as their central banks must intervene to prevent currency depreciation. Even under flexible exchange rates, the magnitude of the effect depends on the price elasticity of exports and imports, which varies across countries depending on their industrial structure and the nature of their traded goods.

The asset price channel works through the impact of monetary policy on stock markets and real estate prices. Expansionary monetary policy tends to raise asset prices through two mechanisms. First, lower interest rates reduce the discount rate applied to future cash flows, increasing the present value of stocks and real estate. Second, lower rates make bonds and bank deposits less attractive relative to equities and property, causing portfolio reallocation toward these assets and driving up their prices. Rising asset prices generate a wealth effect: as households perceive themselves to be wealthier, they increase consumption even if their current income remains unchanged. This effect is particularly strong for homeowners, whose housing wealth constitutes a large share of total wealth. However, the wealth effect operates asymmetrically across income groups, as asset ownership is concentrated among higher-income households who have lower marginal propensities to consume.

The credit channel emphasizes how monetary policy affects the availability of credit beyond its direct effect on interest rates. This channel has two distinct components: the bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel. The bank lending channel operates when monetary policy affects banks’ capacity or willingness to lend. When the central bank raises interest rates, banks face higher funding costs, which may lead them to reduce lending if they cannot fully pass these costs on to borrowers. This effect is strongest for banks with limited access to non-deposit funding sources. The balance sheet channel operates through borrowers rather than lenders. Higher interest rates worsen borrowers’ balance sheets by reducing their net worth and cash flow, making them appear riskier to lenders and leading to credit rationing even if interest rates themselves do not change dramatically. Conversely, expansionary monetary policy improves borrowers’ balance sheets, expanding credit availability. This channel is particularly important during financial crises when credit constraints bind tightly.

The expectations channel has gained prominence as central banks have increasingly relied on forward guidance—communication about future policy intentions—to influence economic behavior. By shaping expectations about future interest rates, inflation, and economic conditions, central banks can affect current spending decisions even when the current policy rate is constrained by the effective lower bound. If households and firms believe that interest rates will remain low for an extended period, they have greater incentive to borrow and spend today. Similarly, if central banks can credibly commit to allowing inflation to rise temporarily above target, real interest rates decline even if nominal rates are unchanged, stimulating demand. The effectiveness of this channel depends crucially on the credibility of central bank communication: if markets doubt the central bank’s commitment to its stated policy path, forward guidance will fail to influence expectations and behavior.

These channels do not operate in isolation but interact in complex ways. Monetary policy affects the economy through multiple channels simultaneously, with the relative importance of each channel varying across economic conditions and institutional contexts. During normal times, the interest rate channel tends to dominate, as changes in borrowing costs have direct and predictable effects on spending. However, during financial crises, when credit markets malfunction, the credit channel becomes paramount. Similarly, in small open economies with flexible exchange rates, the exchange rate channel may be more important than in large, relatively closed economies. Understanding how these channels interact and which are most relevant in specific circumstances is essential for effective monetary policy.

The limitations of each channel also matter for policy design. When the policy rate reaches the effective lower bound—the lowest level to which it can be reduced without triggering large-scale currency hoarding—the interest rate channel becomes impaired, forcing central banks to rely more heavily on unconventional tools such as quantitative easing and forward guidance that work primarily through the asset price and expectations channels. Moreover, if households and firms are highly indebted, further monetary stimulus may be ineffective as borrowers prioritize deleveraging over new spending, a phenomenon sometimes called a “balance sheet recession.” Recognition of these limitations has led central banks to develop a more diverse toolkit and to coordinate monetary policy with macroprudential regulation aimed at maintaining financial stability.

The heterogeneous effects of monetary transmission across different economic agents also have important distributional implications. Asset price increases benefit asset owners, who tend to be wealthier, while lower interest rates hurt savers, who tend to be older and more risk-averse. These distributional consequences can affect the aggregate impact of monetary policy if different groups have different marginal propensities to consume, and they raise important questions about the political economy of monetary policy. As central banks navigate an era of low interest rates and unconventional policies, greater attention to these distributional effects may be necessary to maintain the social and political legitimacy of monetary institutions.

設問

(1) Identify and briefly explain the five transmission channels discussed in this passage. Write your answer in approximately 120 Japanese characters. (7点)

(2) According to the passage, under what conditions does each channel become most or least effective? Provide at least three examples. Answer in approximately 150 Japanese characters. (9点)

(3) What does the author mean by “balance sheet recession” (paragraph 8)? Explain in approximately 80 Japanese characters. (5点)

(4) Which of the following statements is NOT supported by the passage? (4点)

a) The wealth effect of asset price increases is stronger for higher-income households.

b) Forward guidance is most effective when central bank credibility is high.

c) The exchange rate channel is equally effective under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes.

d) During financial crises, the credit channel becomes more important than the interest rate channel.

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第３問（25点）

以下の英文を読み、後の設問に答えなさい。

Two contrasting approaches to macroeconomic stabilization have dominated policy debates for nearly a century: Keynesian demand management and classical market-based adjustment. These paradigms differ fundamentally in their assumptions about how economies function, their diagnoses of economic problems, and their prescriptions for policy intervention. Understanding these differences is essential for evaluating contemporary macroeconomic policy choices and for anticipating how different policy approaches will affect economic outcomes.

Keynesian economics, which emerged from John Maynard Keynes’s analysis of the Great Depression, emphasizes the central role of aggregate demand in determining economic output and employment. The Keynesian framework begins with the observation that prices and wages are sticky in the short run, meaning they do not adjust immediately to clear markets. This price stickiness has profound implications: when aggregate demand falls—due to a collapse in consumer confidence, a decline in investment, or an external shock—firms reduce production and lay off workers rather than lowering prices. The economy can therefore operate below full employment for extended periods, with involuntary unemployment persisting because wages do not fall enough to restore labor market equilibrium. In this context, recessions are fundamentally demand-side phenomena that require active government intervention to restore full employment.

The Keynesian policy prescription follows directly from this diagnosis. When private sector demand is insufficient, the government should step in to fill the gap through expansionary fiscal policy—increased public spending or tax cuts that boost aggregate demand. The multiplier effect amplifies the impact of fiscal stimulus: each dollar of government spending generates more than one dollar of additional economic activity as the initial recipients of government funds spend their income, creating income for others who then spend in turn. Monetary policy also plays a crucial role in the Keynesian framework, with central banks able to stimulate demand by lowering interest rates, thereby making borrowing cheaper and encouraging investment and consumption. The Keynesian approach thus views economic stabilization as a technical problem that can be solved through judicious application of macroeconomic policy tools.

Classical economics, by contrast, emphasizes the self-correcting properties of market economies and expresses skepticism about the efficacy of government intervention. The classical tradition, which traces its intellectual lineage to Adam Smith and was formalized by economists such as Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent in the late twentieth century, holds that markets clear continuously through price and wage adjustments. If unemployment rises, wages fall, making it profitable for firms to hire more workers; if output exceeds demand, prices fall, stimulating additional consumption. These adjustment mechanisms ensure that economies naturally gravitate toward full employment equilibrium without government intervention. Recessions, in this view, are typically caused by supply-side factors—such as productivity shocks or regulatory distortions—or by misguided government policies that interfere with market clearing.

The classical policy prescription flows from this analysis: the government’s role should be limited to establishing clear rules, protecting property rights, and avoiding policies that distort market signals. Discretionary fiscal stimulus is not only unnecessary but potentially harmful. Government borrowing to finance spending drives up interest rates, crowding out private investment that would have been more productive. Moreover, rational economic agents anticipate that current deficits will require future tax increases; they therefore increase saving rather than consumption, offsetting the stimulative effect of government spending. This argument, known as Ricardian equivalence, implies that fiscal policy has little or no effect on aggregate demand. Monetary policy, similarly, is thought to affect only nominal variables such as the price level, with no lasting impact on real output or employment. In the classical framework, the central bank’s proper role is simply to maintain price stability by ensuring that money supply growth matches the economy’s productive capacity.

These theoretical differences translate into sharply divergent policy recommendations during economic downturns. When faced with the 2008 financial crisis, for instance, Keynesian economists advocated aggressive fiscal stimulus to offset the collapse in private demand, while classical economists warned that such stimulus would be ineffective and would saddle future generations with unsustainable debt burdens. Similarly, the two approaches offer contrasting interpretations of Japan’s “lost decades”: Keynesians attribute Japan’s prolonged stagnation to insufficient fiscal stimulus and premature fiscal consolidation, whereas classical economists point to structural rigidities in Japanese labor and product markets that prevent efficient reallocation of resources.

Empirical evidence has not decisively resolved this debate, as both approaches can claim supporting evidence depending on the historical episodes and econometric methods employed. Keynesians point to the robust recoveries that followed fiscal expansions during World War II and the Global Financial Crisis as validation of demand-side management. Classicists counter that these episodes confound multiple factors and that more careful analysis reveals limited fiscal multipliers, especially in economies with high public debt or open capital markets where stimulus spending leaks abroad through imports. The policy implications of theoretical uncertainty are profound: if Keynesian analysis is correct but classical policies are pursued, prolonged recessions and unnecessary suffering result; conversely, if classical analysis is correct but Keynesian policies are implemented, resources are wasted and long-term growth may be impaired.

A more nuanced view recognizes that both approaches capture important aspects of economic reality, with their relative validity depending on economic conditions and institutional context. In deep recessions characterized by widespread idle capacity and deflationary pressures, Keynesian demand-side management becomes more relevant as price flexibility alone cannot restore equilibrium when the problem is fundamentally one of insufficient demand. Conversely, in periods of supply constraints or when inflation is already high, classical emphasis on market adjustment and supply-side reforms is more appropriate. The effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on factors that vary across countries and time periods: the size of the output gap, the marginal propensity to consume, the openness of the economy, the exchange rate regime, and the credibility of fiscal authorities.

Modern macroeconomic policy increasingly attempts to synthesize insights from both traditions. Central banks target inflation while also responding to output gaps, implicitly acknowledging both the classical concern for price stability and the Keynesian recognition that monetary policy affects real activity in the short run. Fiscal policy is designed with automatic stabilizers—such as progressive taxation and unemployment insurance—that provide countercyclical support without requiring discretionary decisions, combining Keynesian stabilization with classical concerns about the politicization of fiscal policy. Yet fundamental disagreements persist, and the pendulum of intellectual fashion continues to swing between emphasis on demand management and emphasis on supply-side structural reform, often driven more by ideological commitments and political considerations than by careful evaluation of evidence.

The stakes in this debate extend beyond technical economics to questions of political philosophy and social values. The Keynesian tradition reflects a belief in the state’s capacity and responsibility to manage the economy for the common good, accepting higher government involvement as the price of economic stability and full employment. The classical tradition embodies a commitment to individual liberty and market freedom, viewing government intervention with suspicion even when markets produce imperfect outcomes. These philosophical differences ensure that the Keynesian-classical debate will persist, shaping not only macroeconomic policy but also broader debates about the proper role of government in society.

設問

(1) Summarize the main assumptions and policy prescriptions of Keynesian economics in approximately 120 Japanese characters. (6点)

(2) Summarize the main assumptions and policy prescriptions of classical economics in approximately 120 Japanese characters. (6点)

(3) According to the passage, under what conditions is each approach more applicable? Explain in approximately 120 Japanese characters. (7点)

(4) The passage suggests that the Keynesian-classical debate involves not only economic analysis but also philosophical differences. Explain what these philosophical differences are in approximately 100 Japanese characters. (6点)

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第４問（25点）

以下の英文を読み、後の設問に答えなさい。

The rise of income inequality in advanced economies over the past four decades presents one of the most pressing challenges for contemporary economic policy. Inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient or the share of income going to the top percentiles, has increased dramatically in most developed countries, reversing a post-World War II trend toward greater equality. This widening gap between rich and poor raises concerns about social cohesion, political stability, and the sustainability of democratic institutions. It also poses fundamental questions about the functioning of market economies and the appropriate role of government in shaping distributional outcomes. Understanding the causes of rising inequality is essential for designing effective policy responses that can address distributional concerns while preserving economic dynamism.

Multiple factors have contributed to the increase in income inequality, and disentangling their relative importance remains a subject of active research and debate. Technological change, particularly the rapid advancement of information and communications technology, has played a central role. Skill-biased technological change increases the productivity of highly educated workers while reducing demand for routine tasks that can be automated. As computers and robots replace assembly-line workers and clerical staff, the wage premium for college graduates relative to high school graduates has risen substantially. This mechanism explains much of the increase in wage inequality within countries: workers with the skills to complement new technologies capture growing shares of income, while those whose skills are substitutable with technology see their earnings stagnate or decline.

Globalization has reinforced these trends by intensifying competition in labor markets. Trade liberalization and the emergence of global supply chains have allowed firms in advanced economies to offshore production to countries with lower labor costs, reducing employment opportunities for less-skilled workers in import-competing sectors. While trade creates aggregate gains through specialization and comparative advantage, these gains are distributed unevenly. High-skilled workers in export-oriented industries and consumers who benefit from lower prices gain, while workers in manufacturing and other tradable sectors face downward pressure on wages and increased job insecurity. The China shock—the rapid integration of China into the global economy following its WTO accession in 2001—dramatically accelerated these effects, contributing to manufacturing employment declines in the United States and Europe.

Changes in labor market institutions have further exacerbated inequality by weakening mechanisms that previously compressed the wage distribution. Union membership has declined sharply in most advanced economies, falling from over 30 percent of the workforce in the 1970s to below 15 percent today in many countries. Weaker unions reduce workers’ bargaining power, allowing employers to capture a larger share of productivity gains. The erosion of minimum wage protections, measured in real terms, has similarly contributed to growing wage inequality at the bottom of the distribution. These institutional changes did not occur in a vacuum but reflected deliberate policy choices influenced by shifting political coalitions and ideological trends favoring market flexibility over labor protections.

Tax policy has amplified the increase in market income inequality. Reductions in top marginal tax rates, from levels exceeding 70 percent in the 1970s to 35-40 percent or lower today in many countries, have allowed post-tax income to concentrate at the top of the distribution. Corporate tax cuts and preferential treatment of capital gains have further benefited high-income households, who derive a larger share of their income from capital rather than labor. The shift toward less progressive taxation occurred alongside retrenchment of the welfare state in some countries, reducing the redistributive impact of government transfers. While tax competition among jurisdictions and concerns about economic efficiency provide some justification for lower rates, the magnitude and distributional consequences of these changes raise questions about whether the tax system adequately reflects societal preferences regarding equity.

The consequences of rising inequality extend well beyond economic measures to affect social and political outcomes. High levels of inequality can undermine social cohesion by creating separate worlds for rich and poor, with limited interaction or shared experience across income groups. Educational opportunities increasingly diverge, as affluent families invest heavily in their children’s education while public schools in low-income areas deteriorate. Health outcomes, life expectancy, and even geographic mobility show growing disparities correlated with income. Political polarization intensifies as economic anxiety fuels support for populist movements that exploit grievances related to inequality. Some political scientists argue that extreme inequality threatens democratic governance itself by allowing wealthy elites to exert disproportionate influence over policy through campaign contributions and lobbying, creating a self-reinforcing cycle in which economic inequality begets political inequality.

Economic theory offers conflicting perspectives on whether high inequality is problematic for growth. Some economists argue that inequality provides necessary incentives for entrepreneurship and risk-taking, with the prospect of high rewards spurring innovation and investment. In this view, redistribution that reduces inequality also reduces these productive incentives, leading to lower economic dynamism. Others contend that high inequality impedes growth by limiting human capital accumulation among disadvantaged groups, reducing aggregate demand when income shifts to high-income households with lower propensities to consume, and creating political instability that deters investment. Empirical studies have produced mixed results, with some finding negative correlations between inequality and subsequent growth while others find no systematic relationship. The answer likely depends on the level and type of inequality, as well as on country-specific institutions and policies.

Policy responses to rising inequality fall into two broad categories: market-based interventions that affect the pre-tax distribution of income and redistributive policies that transfer income from rich to poor. Market-based approaches include investments in education and skills training to reduce the supply of low-skilled labor and increase the supply of high-skilled labor, thereby compressing the wage distribution. Active labor market policies, such as job placement assistance and wage subsidies, can help workers transition to new employment when their industries decline. Strengthening collective bargaining institutions and raising minimum wages can boost the earnings of low-wage workers directly. These interventions aim to make the market income distribution more equal, reducing the need for redistribution.

Redistributive approaches work through the tax-and-transfer system. Progressive taxation, with higher marginal rates on top earners and taxation of capital income comparable to labor income, can reduce post-tax inequality. Expansion of social insurance programs—including unemployment benefits, healthcare, pensions, and family support—provides economic security and reduces the variance of lifetime income. Refundable tax credits, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States, supplement the earnings of low-income workers while preserving work incentives. Universal basic income, a more radical proposal, would provide all citizens with an unconditional cash payment, potentially simplifying the welfare system while ensuring a basic standard of living. Each approach involves trade-offs between equity and efficiency, with the optimal mix depending on societal values and empirical evidence about behavioral responses to different policies.

The political economy of addressing inequality presents formidable challenges. Those who benefit from the current distribution of income—high earners and capital owners—have strong incentives to resist policies that would reduce their share, and they often have disproportionate political influence. Meanwhile, the diffuse and long-term nature of the benefits from inequality reduction makes it difficult to mobilize political support for reform. Politicians face pressure to prioritize immediate economic concerns such as growth and employment over distributional issues, and voters may be skeptical that government can effectively address inequality without creating harmful distortions. International competition further constrains national policy options, as high-tax jurisdictions risk capital flight and brain drain if other countries maintain lower rates.

Despite these obstacles, several countries have managed to combine relatively low inequality with strong economic performance, suggesting that the equity-efficiency trade-off is not as stark as sometimes claimed. The Nordic countries, in particular, achieve low Gini coefficients through comprehensive welfare states, progressive taxation, and active labor market policies, while maintaining high living standards and productivity levels. Their success demonstrates that well-designed policies can address inequality without sacrificing economic dynamism, though replicating their institutional arrangements in countries with different political cultures and historical legacies may prove difficult. The challenge for policymakers in high-inequality countries is to craft feasible reform proposals that can gain political support while effectively addressing distributional concerns.

設問

(1) According to the passage, what are the main causes of rising income inequality? List at least four factors and briefly explain each in approximately 150 Japanese characters. (8点)

(2) The passage discusses both economic and non-economic consequences of inequality. Summarize these consequences in approximately 120 Japanese characters. (6点)

(3) Compare and contrast “market-based interventions” and “redistributive approaches” as described in the passage. Answer in approximately 120 Japanese characters. (6点)

(4) Based on the passage, which of the following statements best captures the author’s position on addressing inequality? (5点)

a) Inequality should not be addressed because it provides necessary economic incentives.

b) Addressing inequality is impossible due to political economy constraints.

c) Nordic countries demonstrate that low inequality and strong economic performance can coexist.

d) Redistribution inevitably reduces economic growth regardless of how it is designed.

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解答・解説

難易度構成

難易度	配点	大問
標準	20点	第１問(1)(4)、第２問(3)(4)、第３問(1)(2)
発展	45点	第１問(2)(3)、第２問(1)(2)、第３問(3)(4)、第４問(2)(3)
難関	35点	第４問(1)(4)

結果の活用

得点	判定	推奨アクション
80点以上	A	過去問演習へ進む
60-79点	B	弱点分野を補強後、再挑戦
40-59点	C	講義編を復習後、再挑戦
40点未満	D	講義編を再学習

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第１問 解答・解説

【戦略的情報】

項目	内容
出題意図	論証型の文章構造を把握し、筆者の主張、根拠、論理展開を正確に理解する能力
難易度	発展
目標解答時間	20分

【思考プロセス】

状況設定

試験時間80分のうち、この大問に20分程度を配分する。1,200語程度の論説文であり、問題解決型の談話構造を予測して読み進める。冒頭段落の “fundamental challenge” と “consensus has eroded” から、問題提示→原因分析→解決策提案という流れを予測する。

レベル1：初動判断

冒頭段落で「保護主義の台頭」という問題を確認する。各段落の第一文を拾い読みし、Para 2-5が原因分析、Para 6が保護主義批判、Para 7-8が解決策、Para 9が結論という構成を把握する。

レベル2：情報の取捨選択

設問(1)は原因、(2)は理論的背景、(3)は実証的証拠、(4)は筆者の立場を問う。各設問の根拠となる段落を特定し、該当箇所を精読対象とする。

レベル3：解答構築

設問(1)についてはPara 2-3の情報を統合し、「分配の不均等」と「補償の失敗」という二つの要因を特定する。設問(2)についてはPara 3の “abstracts from” の語義と、直前の “political economy constraints” の具体的内容を結合して説明する。設問(3)についてはPara 4の “contradicting the assumption” に着目し、従来理論の前提と実証結果の乖離を説明する。設問(4)についてはPara 6-9の論理展開から筆者の立場を特定する。

判断手順ログ

手順1：冒頭段落で問題解決型の構造を確認。手順2：各段落の機能を特定。手順3：設問と段落の対応を確認。手順4：該当箇所を精読し、解答を構築。

【解答】

(1) 自由貿易が生み出す利益が国内で不均等に分配され、輸入競争にさらされる労働者が深刻な調整費用を負担する一方、利益を得る側による補償が政治的に実現されなかったため。（80字）

(2) 理論上は勝者が敗者を補償可能でも、現実には勝者の政治力が大きく補償が実現されないという政治経済学的制約を、カルドア＝ヒックス基準が考慮していないという意味。（98字）

(3) 中国からの輸入競争による失業の影響が十年以上持続し、貿易理論が想定していた労働市場の迅速な調整が現実には機能しないことを実証的に示した点。（90字）

(4) c

【解答のポイント】

正解の論拠: 設問(1)はPara 2「分配の不均等」とPara 3「補償の失敗」の統合による。設問(2)は “abstracts from”（考慮しない）の意味と “political economy constraints” の具体化による。設問(3)はPara 4の “contradicting the assumption of rapid labor market adjustment” が直接根拠となる。設問(4)はPara 7-9で筆者が保護主義を否定し、国内の分配政策による両立を主張していることによる。

誤答の論拠: 選択肢aは筆者が自由貿易の放棄を主張していないため不適。選択肢bは保護主義を明確に否定しているため不適。選択肢dの “inevitably” が筆者の条件付き主張と矛盾するため不適。

【再現性チェック】

この解法が有効な条件: 問題解決型の談話構造を持つ論説文において、原因分析と解決策提案を区別して読み解く場合。

【参照】

• [M25-談話] └ 談話構造の型と認識

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第２問 解答・解説

【戦略的情報】

項目	内容
出題意図	説明型の文章構造を把握し、複数の概念を体系的に整理・理解する能力
難易度	発展
目標解答時間	20分

【思考プロセス】

状況設定

1,300語程度の説明型文章。金融政策の伝達経路という専門的な主題を扱う。分類型の構造を予測し、各経路の定義、メカニズム、有効性の条件を整理しながら読み進める。

レベル1：初動判断

冒頭段落の “multiple, interconnected channels” から分類型の構造を確認。Para 2-6が各経路の説明、Para 7-9が統合的考察という構成を把握する。

レベル2：情報の取捨選択

設問(1)は全経路の概要、(2)は有効性の条件、(3)は専門用語の定義、(4)は詳細情報の正誤。各段落の冒頭と末尾に注目し、経路ごとの核心的メカニズムと条件を抽出する。

レベル3：解答構築

設問(1)についてはPara 2-6の各段落から経路名と核心メカニズムを抽出し、簡潔に要約する。設問(2)については各段落の後半とPara 7-8から、有効性が変化する条件を具体的に3例以上抽出する。設問(3)についてはPara 8の “borrowers prioritize deleveraging over new spending” を定義として抽出する。設問(4)については各選択肢を本文の該当箇所と照合し、矛盾するものを特定する。

判断手順ログ

手順1：分類型構造を確認。手順2：各経路の段落を特定。手順3：経路ごとにメカニズムと条件を整理。手順4：設問と段落の対応を確認して解答。

【解答】

(1) ５つの伝達経路は、金利経路（借入コストの変化）、為替経路（通貨変動）、資産価格経路（富効果）、信用経路（貸出能力・意欲）、期待経路（将来の政策への期待形成）である。（109字）

(2) 金利経路はゼロ金利下で機能不全に、為替経路は固定相場制で無効に、信用経路は金融危機時に重要性が増す。期待経路は中央銀行の信認がなければ効果がない。（102字）

(3) 家計や企業が高債務を抱える状況で、金融緩和が行われても新規支出より債務返済を優先するため、金融政策の効果が薄れる不況状態を指す。（89字）

(4) c

【解答のポイント】

正解の論拠: 設問(1)はPara 2-6の主題文から各経路を特定。設問(2)は各段落の後半の条件記述を抽出。設問(3)はPara 8の定義部分による。設問(4)はPara 3で “countries with fixed exchange rates cannot exploit this mechanism” と明記されており、選択肢cは本文と矛盾する。

誤答の論拠: 選択肢a、b、dはそれぞれPara 4、Para 6、Para 7で支持されている。

【再現性チェック】

この解法が有効な条件: 分類型・説明型の文章において、各カテゴリーの定義と特徴、そしてそれらの間の関係性を整理する場合。

【参照】

• [M25-意味] └ 概念の階層構造と意味ネットワーク

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第３問 解答・解説

【戦略的情報】

項目	内容
出題意図	比較対照型の文章構造を把握し、二つの対立する理論の想定、処方箋、適用条件を正確に理解する能力
難易度	発展
目標解答時間	20分

【思考プロセス】

状況設定

1,400語程度の比較対照型文章。ケインズ経済学と古典派経済学という二つのマクロ経済理論を対比する。ブロック法による構成を予測し、各理論の想定→処方箋→適用条件という順で情報を整理する。

レベル1：初動判断

冒頭段落の “Two contrasting approaches” から比較対照型の構造を確認。Para 2-3がケインズ派、Para 4-5が古典派、Para 6-10が比較・統合という構成を把握する。

レベル2：情報の取捨選択

設問(1)(2)は各理論の要約、(3)は適用条件、(4)は哲学的背景。Para 2-3とPara 4-5を精読対象とし、Para 8とPara 10から条件と哲学的背景を抽出する。

レベル3：解答構築

設問(1)についてはPara 2-3から「価格の硬直性」という想定と「需要刺激策」という処方箋を抽出。設問(2)についてはPara 4-5から「市場の自動調整」という想定と「政府不介入」という処方箋を抽出。設問(3)についてはPara 8の条件記述を要約。設問(4)についてはPara 10の哲学的対立を説明。

判断手順ログ

手順1：比較対照型構造を確認。手順2：各ブロックの段落を特定。手順3：想定と処方箋を抽出。手順4：統合部分から条件と哲学を抽出。

【解答】

(1) ケインズ経済学は、価格と賃金の硬直性により需要不足で不況が生じると考え、政府が財政・金融政策で需要を刺激し、完全雇用を回復すべきだと主張する。（99字）

(2) 古典派経済学は、市場は価格調整を通じて自動的に完全雇用に達すると考え、政府介入は不要かつ有害であり、物価安定のみを目指すべきだと主張する。（90字）

(3) ケインズ的アプローチは、遊休能力が大きくデフレ圧力のある深刻な不況時により妥当である。古典派アプローチは、供給制約がある時やインフレが既に高い時により適切である。（106字）

(4) ケインズ的伝統は国家による経済管理の責任と能力を信じるのに対し、古典派伝統は個人の自由と市場を重視し、政府介入を疑うという点。（91字）

【解答のポイント】

正解の論拠: 設問(1)(2)は各ブロックの「想定」と「処方箋」を統合。設問(3)はPara 8の条件記述を対比的に要約。設問(4)はPara 10の哲学的対立を要約。

誤答の論拠: 設問(1)(2)で「想定」と「処方箋」のどちらか一方のみでは不十分。設問(3)で一方のみの記述は設問の要求を満たさない。設問(4)で経済学的相違のみでは「哲学的」という条件を満たさない。

【再現性チェック】

この解法が有効な条件: 比較対照型の文章において、比較の基準を明確に識別し、情報を整理する場合。

【参照】

• [M25-談話] └ 談話構造の型と認識

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第４問 解答・解説

【戦略的情報】

項目	内容
出題意図	複数の原因と結果を分析する文章構造を把握し、複雑な社会問題に関する多角的な情報を整理・統合する能力
難易度	難関
目標解答時間	20分

【思考プロセス】

状況設定

1,500語程度の原因分析型文章。所得格差という複雑な社会問題を扱う。問題提示→原因分析→結果分析→解決策という構成を予測し、複数の原因と解決策を体系的に整理する。

レベル1：初動判断

冒頭段落で問題提示（所得格差の拡大）を確認。Para 2-5が原因分析、Para 6-7が結果分析、Para 8-9が解決策、Para 10-11が政治的制約と成功事例という構成を把握する。

レベル2：情報の取捨選択

設問(1)は原因、(2)は結果、(3)は解決策の比較、(4)は筆者の立場。Para 2-5から4つの原因を、Para 6-7から経済的・非経済的結果を、Para 8-9から2種類の解決策を抽出する。

レベル3：解答構築

設問(1)についてはPara 2-5から「技術変化」「グローバル化」「労働市場制度」「税制」を特定し、各メカニズムを簡潔に説明。設問(2)についてはPara 6から社会的・政治的帰結を、Para 7から経済成長への影響を抽出し、カテゴリー化。設問(3)についてはPara 8とPara 9の違いを対比的に説明。設問(4)についてはPara 11の北欧諸国の成功事例から、筆者の立場を特定。

判断手順ログ

手順1：原因分析型構造を確認。手順2：原因・結果・解決策の段落を特定。手順3：各カテゴリーから情報を抽出。手順4：筆者の最終的立場を結論部から特定。

【解答】

(1) ①技能偏向的技術変化（高技能労働者の賃金上昇）、②グローバル化（低技能労働者の雇用・賃金への下方圧力）、③労働市場制度の弱体化（労働組合の交渉力低下）、④税制の逆進性強化（富裕層への減税）が主要因である。（123字）

(2) 経済的には総需要抑制や人的資本蓄積の阻害、社会的には結束の弱化や教育・健康格差の拡大、政治的には二極化の激化や民主的統治への脅威などが挙げられる。（109字）

(3) 市場的介入は教育投資や最低賃金引き上げ等で税引き前の所得分配を是正するのに対し、再分配的アプローチは累進課税や社会保障等で税引き後の所得を事後的に再分配する。（108字）

(4) c

【解答のポイント】

正解の論拠: 設問(1)はPara 2-5の各段落から原因を特定。設問(2)はPara 6-7から結果をカテゴリー化。設問(3)はPara 8-9の根本的違いを対比。設問(4)はPara 11の北欧事例が筆者の立場を示す。

誤答の論拠: 選択肢a、b、dは筆者の最終的立場と矛盾。筆者は困難さを認めつつも両立可能性を示唆している。

【再現性チェック】

この解法が有効な条件: 複数の原因・結果・解決策が提示される複雑な社会問題に関する文章において、情報を構造的に整理する場合。

【参照】

• [M25-意味] └ 因果関係の連鎖と構造
• [M25-談話] └ 多層的構造の統合的把握

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体系的接続

• [M26-談話] └ 図表・複数資料の読解における構造分析
• [M27-談話] └ 要約と情報の圧縮における構造的把握の応用
• [M30-談話] └ 設問形式と解答の構成における戦略的読解